ABSTRACT The ever-increasing advancement in communication technologies of modern smart objects brings with it a new era of application development for Internet of Things (IoT)-based networks. In particular, owing to the contactless-ness nature and efficiency of the data retrieval of mobile smart objects, such as wearable equipment or tailored bio-sensors, several innovative types of healthcare systems with body sensor networks (BSN) have been proposed. In this paper, we introduce a secure IoT-based healthcare system, which operates through the BSN architecture. To simultaneously achieve system efficiency and robustness of transmission within public IoT-based communication networks, we utilize robust crypto-primitives to construct two communication mechanisms for ensuring transmission confidentiality and providing entity authentication among smart objects, the local processing unit and the backend BSN server. Moreover, we realize the implementation of the proposed healthcare system with the Raspberry PI platform to demonstrate the practicability and feasibility of the presented mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid advancement in smart object technology has included significant achievements in application development for wireless sensor based distributed communication architecture. Capitalizing on the contactless-ness and efficiency of data retrieval from modern smart objects, various innovative types of on-demand and real-time IoT-based services have been developed and deployed in daily life. Principal criteria regarding data processing, such as the volume, velocity, variety and, most importantly, the veracity of the data, must be considered carefully when designing IoT-based applications. However, while IoT-oriented techniques pave the way for the development of innovative applications, new threats may arise from these ''opportunities''. For example, Hello Barbie, a novel IoT-based commercial product for children, reveals a potential privacy threat which allows an attacker to spy on consumers, their families and everything in the house [15] . The attack is based on specific functionalities, namely the camera and voice-interaction, which support the operation of the IoT product and its interactive applications.
Today, the IoT has become one of the most promising communication paradigms, and one in which all the smart objects in our daily life become part of the Internet owing to their communication and computing capabilities. This opportunity brings with it new security challenges for IoT applications. Every smart object (or sensor) in the IoT represents a potential risk in terms of system vulnerability. That is, each intelligent object may become a vulnerable entry point for any malicious attack. Two security issues, i.e. (1) physical protection for smart objects, and (2) how to maintain data confidentiality, integrity and privacy during data collection among smart objects, have thus emerged. Given the novelty and innovative nature of IoT technologies, there seems to be a general expectation for a new and revolutionary security solution tailored specifically to IoT-based objects. This is because traditional security protection mechanisms may not be suitable for smart objects. For example, firewalls containing network management control protocols are able to manage high-level traffic through the Internet. However, this application-level solution is not suitable for endpoint devices in IoT applications because these devices usually possess a specific, defined mission with limited resources available to accomplish it. Therefore, the refinement of traditional security solutions to fit the specific security requirements of IoT-based smart objects is one of the most promising ways of securing IoT-based application systems.
Normally, security is addressed during the system life cycle, including secure booting, access control, device authentication, network management, firewall, IDS/IPS and updates and patches. Among these, device authentication (with secure device-to-device communication) has been shown to offer significant benefits to the security paradigm of IoT network architecture and has become one of the most indispensable elements in IoT security ecosystems. In an IoT-based application, smart objects often cannot be selfinteracted with a user or the backend system, and often need someone to input the credentials required to access the network. Fortunately, device authentication allowing a device to access a network based on a similar set of credentials pre-stored in a secure storage area of the device itself, represents a possible way to solve this predicament. The academic community has devoted great effort to this important and interesting research field. Hence, in this study we propose two secure device authentication mechanisms for IoT-based healthcare systems relying on body sensor networks. First, we will address the principal security requirements for IoT-based systems. A secure IoT-based healthcare system with two authentication mechanisms operating via BSN network architecture is then proposed to achieve the identified requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the current state of the art of IoT security and discusses the principal security requirements for IoTbased healthcare systems. In Section III, we first introduce the underlying communication architecture of our proposed IoT-based healthcare system. Then, the IoT-based healthcare system using body sensor networks is introduced, comprising two authentication processes among the smart objects, the local processing unit and the backend server. The security robustness of the proposed schemes is analyzed in Section IV, while the system implementation and performance evaluation is presented in Section V. Finally, we make our concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe the current state of the art of IoT security and then discuss the major security requirements for IoT-oriented healthcare systems.
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART OF IOT SECURITY
In recent years, both industry and academia have devoted considerable attention to the development of IoT applications and related security measures. In 2013, Yao et al. [7] presented a lightweight multicast authentication scheme for small-scale IoT applications. They exploited the specific characteristics of the fast accumulator proposed by Nyberg [8] , i.e. the absorbency property and the oneway and quasi-communicative property, to construct a lightweight multicast authentication mechanism. To test their scheme's practicability, the authors evaluated seven principal criteria required by multicast authentications for resourceconstrained applications in the course of a performance analysis. The proposed scheme was claimed to be more efficient and effective than other systems it was compared to. The following year, Bello and Zeadally [9] investigated the possibility of self-collaborated device-to-device communications without any centralized control. Two challenges, namely the computation cost of smart objects and network heterogeneity, were identified. After that, the authors analyzed the stateof-the-art of communication mechanisms in licensed and unlicensed spectra and routing techniques which are able to support intelligent inter-devices communications. In the course of their analysis, four unresolved issues were identified: 1) maximizing the use of available network resources; 2) route management optimization; 3) inter-device based cooperation for load balancing; and 4) security properties such as privacy, authentication, integrity and resistance to new types of attack. Later, Cai et al. [10] adopted 802.11 based sensors to construct an IoT-based device management system with a centralized control mechanism. The principal technique was based on the IETF Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). To evaluate the scheme's feasibility and effectiveness, the authors implemented an experimental system consisting of an 802.11 enabled sensor, a self-designed management server and an IoT application. The experimental results showed that their proposed system is practicable. However, one limitation exists as the system scalability cannot be guaranteed.
In 2014, Keoh et al. [5] presented an overview of the security solutions for IoT ecosystems proposed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), in which CoAP and, in particular, Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) are examined. Based on their performance evaluation, these authors developed a refined and lightweight DTLS capable of providing robust security functionality for IoT objects. Even so, the authors identified some unresolved issues for future work, i.e. device bootstrapping, key management, authorization, privacy and message fragmentation issues in IoT networks. Next, in 2015, Kawamoto et al. [11] demonstrated an effective data collection scheme for location based authentication in IoT networks. In order to improve the authentication accuracy, parameters related to network control are adjusted dynamically based on the real-time requirements from the system and the surrounding network environment. In addition, optimization of authentication accuracy was investigated. The authors finally suggested that future work could focus on intelligently controlling the data distribution from inhomogeneous IoT devices. In the same year, Cirani et al. [12] introduced an authorization framework which is integrated with HTTP/CoAP services and is even able to invoke an external OAuth (Open Authorization) based service. In the proposed framework, an external client may access a remote service from a network broker (with constrained smart objects) via HTTP/CoAP. Robust communication among entities such as an external client, a network broker and smart objects was thus designed and implemented. VOLUME 4, 2016 Performance evaluations were performed to examine the feasibility of the proposed framework, with results showing that the proposed approach will increase the amount of energy consumed to ensure compatibility with IEEE 802.15.4. In addition, the issues of memory footprint and dynamic configuration make the OAuth logic based scheme infeasible for use with common smart objects.
In 2015, Ning et al. [13] proposed an aggregated proof based hierarchical authentication scheme for layered U2IoT architecture to pursue security protection among ubiquitous things. In the proposed scheme, security properties such as entity anonymity, mutual authentication and hierarchical access control are achieved via the following techniques: user authorization, aggregated-proof based verifications, homomorphism functions and Chebyshev chaotic maps. Later, Hernández-Ramos et al. [14] developed a series of lightweight authentication and authorization procedures which are compliant with the Architectural Reference Model (ARM) from the EU FP7 IoT-A project, for use on constrained smart objects. The proposed schemes are able to be combined with other standard technologies and form security plans for the life cycle of IoT devices. Recently, Gope and Hwang introduced two authentication schemes, i.e. BSN-Care [1] and USM-IoT [2] , for IoT-based networks. These two authentication schemes are designed to fit the security requirements for body sensor networks and distributed wireless sensor networks, respectively. Accordingly, from the standpoint of authentication analysis, the underlying architectures can respectively be characterized as being client-server and client-server-server. In 2015, Gope and Hwang [2] first presented an authentication protocol for distributed wireless sensor networks. Their proposal not only is compatible with client-server-server (i.e. the sensor-gateway-server) architecture, but also satisfies important security properties such as mutual authentication, sensor anonymity and un-traceability, system scalability, and resistance to impersonation attack, replay attack and cloning attack. The authors thus claimed the proposed protocol is secure as well as efficient. In 2016, Gope and Hwang [1] further proposed an authentication mechanism for a distributed IoT-based healthcare system. The proposed protocol is based on body sensor networks (BSNs), which consist of lightweight and healthcare oriented smart objects. Lightweight crypto-modules, such as a one-way hash function random number generation function and bitwise exclusive-OR operation, are adopted to simultaneously pursue system efficiency and security robustness. The authors then investigated the security density and protocol efficiency via BAN logics analysis and computation cost comparison.
B. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR IOT-BASED HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS
In the following, we present the major security requirements for IoT-based communication systems.
1) A SESSION KEY IS REQUIRED FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION
In the past decades, the research community has thoroughly investigated the design of dynamic identity based authentication schemes owing to their advantages in terms of user convenience and protocol efficiency. Lightweight computation modules, such as one-way hash functions and bitwise exclusive-or operation, are usually exploited in the design of secure transmission for each protocol run. Because communication entities' identities are anonymous and unpredictable as a result of the hash function and exclusive-or operation, it can be claimed that this category of authentication provides user anonymity. However, in traditional dynamic identity based authentication mechanisms, a robust session key must be eventually agreed for secure communication among entities. A simple authentication and login activity without session key generation is not enough to guarantee any kind of security. Even if it may be claimed that SSL/TLS or other security techniques can be used to achieve robust security after the authentication, the computation cost involved will make such an approach inefficient. Based on the above reason, we argue that the session key agreement is an essential property for entity authentication and secure communication.
2) INAPPROPRIATE USAGE OF THE BITWISE EXCLUSIVE-OR MODULE MUST BE AVOIDED
Cryptanalysis for security modules is critical for protocol robustness. While the one-way hash function maintains qualified security, the exclusive-or operation may be the attacker's target. It is obvious that the exclusive-or operation can only resist against ''cipher-text only'' attacks, which represents the lowest security level in terms of cryptanalysis activity. Other security guarantees, such as resistance to known plain-text attacks, chosen plain-text attacks, chosen cipher-text attacks, and chosen text attacks launched by a malicious adversary are not supported. Hence, we have to carefully consider the utilization of the exclusive-or operation during the design of each protocol run. More specifically, all publicly transmitted text must be in an unpredictable cipher form and the exclusive-or computation cannot be performed simply and directly on the cipher. It is suggested that all exclusive-or operations must be embedded within the computation of a one-way hash function. For example, the form of ''M ⊕ key'' may be more vulnerable than the form of ''H (M ⊕key)'' or ''H (M ) ⊕ key'', where key is a secret and M is a message.
3) GPS INFORMATION IS SUGGESTED TO RESIST AGAINST SPOOFING ATTACK
The IoT-based communication architecture builds on traditional wireless sensor networks and at the same time embeds body area networks consisting of body bio-sensors. Individual privacy is a key issue to consider owing to the involvement of personal bio-data and sensitive health-related information. Meanwhile, the correctness of application operation incurred by sensor movement must also be considered carefully, including individual identification, network switching, reputation maintenance, anonymity and un-traceability, and resistance to spoofing attacks invoked by a malicious cluster head made up of parts of IoT networks. All these requirements can be supported via the anonymous authentication technique with a unique legitimate identification in which GPS information is involved. That is, with identification of an individual's location, immunity against spoofing attacks can be guaranteed.
4) THE NEED FOR RESISTANCE TO MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
Resistance to man-in-the-middle attack is one of the most important security considerations after authentication. A malicious attacker may interrupt transmitted authentication messages and spoof the legal communicating entities into believing that he/she is the other legitimate side via counterfeited and illegal messages by spoofing. That is, the attacker may pretend that he/she is the legitimate user who is communicating with the server. Spoofing can also be used when the attacker faces the real legitimate user. The attacker may pretend to be the legitimate server to communicate with the legal user. An efficient solution for resisting man-in-the-middle attacks is to embed the identities of all communicating entities into the protocol message for entity authentication. For instance, H (ID i ||ID i+1 || . . .) is a possible form of protocol message which can be utilized to perform entity authentication and simultaneously conquer man-inthe-middle attacks.
5) MULTIPLE SECURITY AND PRIVACY PROPERTIES MUST BE GUARANTEED AT THE SAME TIME
The protection of data security and entity privacy is the most important aspects for IoT-based healthcare systems. As the communication of the BSN is mostly wireless (and insecure) in nature, various attacks may be launched at it as a vulnerability entry, resulting in serious system damage to the entire system. Therefore, in the following, we describe the key security and privacy properties which must be guaranteed in an IoT-based healthcare system. First, mutual authentication among communication entities is required to protect against malicious data access and entity spoofing. Second, the system has to achieve anonymity and untraceability for the biosensors in IoT-based healthcare systems to guard against the disclosure of an individual's personal health status or private information. Third, the resistance against forgery attack and replay attack during system operations must be embedded into the IoT-based healthcare system.
III. THE PROPOSED IoT-BASED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM WITH BODY SENSOR NETWORKS
In this section, we first introduce the underlying communication architecture of our proposed IoT-based healthcare system. Then, the trust boundary and the desired objectives of the proposed IoT-based healthcare scheme are introduced. After that, we present the detailed communication procedures of the proposed system, which consist of a system initialization phase and two authentication phases.
A. THE UNDERLYING IoT-BASED COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
In this sub-section, we present the IoT-based communication architecture on which our proposed healthcare system is modeled. As shown in Figure 1 , there are three indispensable components in the IoT-based communication architecture: the wearable body bio-sensors (i.e. the smart objects), the Local Processing Unit (LPU) (which would normally be an intelligent handheld device and acts as a mobile gateway), and the Body Sensor Networks (BSN) server. The IoT-based biomedical equipment (i.e. body bio-sensors) is adopted (or embedded) by the user as the edge devices which are responsible for collecting bio-data from the human (or, in this case, the patient). All of the collected data will be forwarded to the LPU and BSN server for data analysis and user-oriented service provision. That is, based on specific bio-data from the user, the system can recognize and satisfy the particular individual's needs in a faster and more efficient way. For instance, by analyzing human bio-data, such as electrocardiography (ECG), electroencephalography (EEG), electromyography (EMG) and blood pressure (BP), a healthcare system in a hospital can provide more individually-tailored and timely services and reduce delays in medical treatment. In the proposed IoT-based communication architecture, all the body bio-sensors and the LPU need to perform registrations with the BSN server in advance. After registration, security credentials will be shared and stored among the biosensors, the LPU and the BSN server. The security credentials are exploited to achieve the goal of entity authentication and to establish a secure communication channel, and, in addition, data confidentiality and data integrity can be guaranteed via the system's secure communication feature.
In our proposed healthcare system, two communication channels, i.e. ''sensors to LPU'' and ''LPU to BSN server,'' are focused on, since the openness of these two channels means it cannot be guaranteed that all the data transmissions on them are secure. An attacker (or hacker) may therefore wish to launch malicious behaviors, such as bio-data eavesdropping on a specific person and entity counterfeiting for purposes of spoofing, on these insecure channels. The result could be huge and unpredictable losses. To sum up, the assumptions about the trust boundary of our IoT-based healthcare system are listed below: (1) the security parameters received during the registration phase are under a secure channel; (2) the LPU and sensors are equipped with secure storage; (3) the ''sensors to LPU'' and ''LPU to BSN server'' channels are insecure, i.e. the transmitted data may be sniffed out; (4) the BSN server is trusted and all the database accesses are safe and (5) a trusted third party exists to support the public key infrastructure.
In the following section, we will introduce the communication procedures of the proposed IoT-based healthcare system. The proposed system consists of two phases: the system initialization phase and the authentication phases. In the system initialization phase, all of the security parameters will be agreed upon and shared among the communication entities, i.e. wearable bio-sensors, the LPU and the BSN server, via a secure channel. Next, two authentication phases are presented for securing all the communication and data exchanges among the communication entities. In Table I , we present the common notations used throughout this study.
B. THE SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
Let the notation E/F p denote an elliptic curve E over a prime finite field F p , defined by an equation y 2 = x 3 + ax + b, where a, b ∈ F p are constants such that = 4a 3 +27b 2 = 0. All points P i = (x i , y i ) on E and the infinity point O form a cyclic group G under the operation of point addition R = P + Q defined according to a chord-and-tangent rule. In particular, we define t · P = P + P + . . . + P (t times) as scalar multiplication, where P is a generator of G with order n.
First, given a security parameter k, a trusted third party (short for TTP) generates a group G of elliptic curve points with prime order n and determines a generator P of G. Next, TTP chooses a private key s ∈ Z * n and a secure hash function H : {0, 1} * × G → Z * q [3] . Next, TTP derives a public key PK TTP = s · P and publishes {G, P, PK TTP , H }. Meanwhile, TTP keeps s ∈ Z * n securely. Given {G, P, PK TTP , H }, the private key s and the identity LPU j of local processing unit j, TTP generates a random number r j ∈ Z * n , and calculates R j = r j · P, h j = H (PK TTP , LPU j , R j ) and s j = r j + h j · s mod n. Then, TTP returns D j = (s j , R j ) to the local processing unit j who then checks the validity of D j via whether the equation s j · P = R j + h j · PK TTP mod n holds or not. Once it holds, the local processing unit j picks a random number x j ∈ Z * n as his/her own private key and computes PK j = x j · P as his/her public key. Similarly, TTP chooses a random number r BSN ∈ Z * n , and sends D BSN = (s BSN , R BSN ) to the BSN server, where R BSN = r BSN · P, h BSN = H (PK TTP , BSN , R BSN ) and s BSN = r BSN + h BSN · s mod n. Once the validity of D BSN is verified, the BSN server picks a random number x BSN ∈ Z * n as its private key and computes PK BSN = x BSN · P as its public key.
C. THE COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES OF THE PROPOSED IoT-BASED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
In the proposed IoT-based healthcare system, we consider that a nurse with his/her intelligent devices (acting as a local processing unit) would like to provide on-demand patientcare services via an automatic and contactless data retrieval mechanism. As the IoT communication network is public, a robust authentication procedure is required for secure data exchange among wearable bio-sensors, the local processing unit and the BSN server. The detailed procedures of our proposed authentication mechanisms are presented in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. 1) THE KEY AGREEMENT PHASE BETWEEN THE LOCAL PROCESSING UNIT j AND THE BSN SERVER (FIGURE 2)
, h j and x j , the local processing unit j computes T j = t j · P with a random number
Then, the local processing unit j sends (R j , T j , τ j ) back to the BSN server who then examines the validity of the incoming message (R j , T j , τ j ) with the following verification processes.
With {G, P, PK TTP , H }, PK j , LPU j , BSN and (R j , T j , τ j ), the BSN server computes h j = H (PK TTP , LPU j , R j ) and k j = H (T j , h j , BSN , PK j ). After that, the server verifies whether the equation τ j · P = T j + k j · PK j + R j + h j · PK TTP holds or not. If it holds, the (R j , T j , τ j ) is legitimate. The correctness of (R j , T j , τ j ) is verified by: 
Finally, the local processing unit j and the BSN server both possess and share a session key SK = t BSN · T j = t j · t BSN · P = t j · T BSN .
2) THE AUTHENTICATION PHASE AMONG THE WEARABLE BIO-SENSOR i, THE LOCAL PROCESSING UNIT j AND THE BSN SERVER (FIGURE 3)
In the proposed authentication scheme, K i is a secret shared by the BSN server and the wearable bio-sensor i, and bsID is a set of un-linkable shadow identities bsID={sid 1 , sid 2 ,. . . } generated by the BSN server and installed into the wearable bio-sensor i at the system initialization. Tr seq is a track sequence number created to speed up the authentication process as well as to prevent replay attacks. During each authentication session, Tr seq will be renewed and stored at both the BSN server and the wearable bio-sensor i. In that case, the BSN server is able to check the freshness of an incoming request sent from the wearable bio-sensor i, and to achieve a fast identification of the bio-sensor i via Tr seq at the backend database during the authentication session. If Tr seq in the request does not match the one maintained in the backend database, the BSN server will reject the incoming request and terminate the connection. A new request from the wearable bio-sensor i will be asked for in which one of the fresh shadow identities sid i will be picked up from the list bsID as an anonymous identity of the wearable biosensor i. The shadow identities sid i adopted at this time must VOLUME 4, 2016 FIGURE 3. The authentication phase among the wearable bio-sensor i , the local processing unit j and the BSN server.
be removed from the bsID list at both the BSN server side and the wearable bio-sensor i side after the authentication session.
(Step 1) Local Processing Unit j → Wearable Bio-Sensor i GPS j , LPU j :
The local processing unit j sends its identity LPU j and its global location information GPS j to the wearable bio-sensor i as an authentication request.
( 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Before describing the security analysis, we introduce the adversary model. In the real world, it is possible for adversaries to replace a communication entity's public key with a false one of its choice. Hence, the adversary Adv models an outside adversary who is able to replace any entity's public key with specific values chosen by the adversary itself; however, the adversary Adv does not know the private key of TTP. In addition, the adversary Adv is able to learn valid verification messages for a replaced public key without any submission.
Game 1: The following game is performed between a challenger C and an adversaryAdv during the proposed authentication scheme between the local processing unit and the BSN server.
Initialization: C generates a private key s, and public system parameters {G, P, PK TTP , H }. Next, C keeps s, but gives all of the public system parameters {G, P, PK TTP , σ t , params, ID t , PK t ) . If the public key has not been replaced, PK t = PK t , where PK t is the public key returned from the oracle RequestPublicKey(ID t ). Otherwise, PK t = PK t where PK t is the latest public key value submitted to the oracle ReplacePublicKey(ID t , PK t , PK t ).
• Output: The adversary Advoutputs (ID t , m t , (R t , T t , τ t )). The adversary Adv wins the game if true ← Verify (ID t , m t , (R t , T t , τ t ) PK t ), and the oracle ExtractPartialSecret(ID t ) and SuperSign( ID t , m t ) have never been queried.
Definition 1:
The proposed authentication mechanism between the local processing unit and the BSN server is secure against malicious adversaries, if for any polynomial adversary Adv, Succ j is negligible, where Succ j is the success probability that Adv wins in game 1.
Next, according to the hardness of solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, we prove that our proposed authentication scheme is existentially secure against malicious adversaries. Note that the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (short for ECDLP) is defined as follows: given a group G of elliptic curve points with prime order n, a generator P of G and a point x · P, it is computationally infeasible to derive x, where x ∈ Z * n . Theorem 1: The proposed authentication scheme is existentially secure against malicious adversary in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. That is, if there exist a polynomial-time (pt,q eps ,q es ,q pk ,q rpk ,q ss ) adversary α 1 which can submit at most q eps queries to the oracle ExtractPartialSecret(ID t ), q es queries to the oracle ExtractSecret(ID t ),q pk queries to the oracle RequestPublicKey( ID t ),q rpk queries to the oracle ReplacePublicKey(ID t , PK t , PK t ) andq ss queries to the oracle SuperSign(ID t , m t ) and Succ α 1 is negligible, where Succ α 1 is the success probability that α 1 wins in game 1, then there exists another algorithm β which can solve a random instance of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time with success probability
Proof: Let α 1 be a polynomial-time adversary that breaks the proposed authentication scheme with non-negligible advantage Succ α 1 . The goal of this proof is to build a polynomial-time algorithm β which uses α 1 to solve the ECDLP. That is, given a random instance (P, x · P), it derives the secret x.
In the Initialization phase, βpicks an identity ID * t as the challenged identity in game 1, sets PK TTP = Q and sends public system parameters {G, P, PK TTP , H } to α 1 .
In the query phase, α 1 can adaptively issue the following oracle queries to β, and each query is unique.
Hash query: For each query, β maintains a list list H storing (T t , h t , LPU j , BSN , R t , PK t , H t ), where t means the local processing unit j or the BSN server. Upon receiving an H query for some (T t , h t , LPU j , BSN , R t , PK t , H t ) from α 1 , β checks the list H and returns H t to α 1 via the following steps.
(1) If (T t , h t , LPU j , BSN , R t , PK t , H t ) exists in list H , β directly returns H t to α 1 and terminates the process.
(2) Otherwise, it chooses a random value H t ∈ Z * n , adds (T t , h t , LPU j , BSN , R t , PK t , H t ) into list H , and returns H t to α 1 .
RequestPublicKey(ID t ): Upon receiving a query with an identity ID t from α 1 , β performs the following steps.
t ) with j = 1, 2, 3, 4, satisfying the following equations τ
mod n, where j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Based on the four linear and independent equations, β can derive the four unknown values t t , x t , r t and s, and outputs s as the solution of the random instance (P, Q = s · P) of the ECDLP. Next, we analyze β's success probability Succ β of winning game 1.
• E 1 : β does not abort in all the queries of ExtractPartialSecret.
• E 2 : α 1 can forge a valid signature (ID t , m t , σ t ).
• Then, the probability that β solves the given instance of the ECDLP is
Hence, the algorithm β can solve the ECDLP with, at minimum, the advantage Next, we present security claims for the proposed authentication mechanism among the wearable bio-sensor, the local processing unit and the BSN server.
Theorem 2: To achieve mutual authentication between the wearable bio-sensor and the local processing unit
The mutual authentication of the proposed authentication mechanism is proven via BAN logic analysis [4] . Basic constructs and logic postulates are presented in the following, where the symbols P and Q range over principals, X and Y range over statements, and K ranges over long-term secrets keys.
Constructs:
• P believes X : The principal P believes that X is true.
• P sees X : Someone has sent a message containing X to P, who can read and repeat X (possibly after doing some decryption).
• P said X : P has actually sent a message including statement X at the current session of the protocol or before.
• P controls X : P has jurisdiction over X , i.e. the principal P is an authority on X and this matter should be trusted.
• fresh(X ): X has not been sent in a message before the current session of the protocol.
• P K ←− −→ Q: The key K is shared between the principals P and Q.
• P X ←− −→ Q: The formula X is a secret known only to P and Q. Only P and Q may use X to prove their identities to each other. Logical postulates:
• Rule 1 (the message-meaning rules): If P believes P K ←− −→ Q and P sees {X } K , then we postulate P believes Q said X .
• Rule 2 (the nonce-verification rule): If P believes fresh (X ) and P believes Q said X , then we postulate P believes Q believes X .
• Rule 3 (the jurisdiction rule): If P believes Q controls X and P believes Q believes X , then we postulate P believes X .
• Rule 4: If P sees (X , Y ) then P sees X . In addition, if P believes P X ←− −→ Q and P sees {X } K , then P sees X . • Rule 5: If one part of a formula is fresh, then the entire formula must also be fresh. If P believes fresh (X ), then P believes fresh (X ,Y ). Assumption: (7), (12) and (14) , and the assumption of the trustworthiness of S, both the wearable bio-sensor and the local processing unit can be authenticated by each other via S.
Claim 1: Guaranteeing anonymity and untraceability for wearable bio-sensors i.
In the proposed communication procedures, a random number N i is generated and utilized to randomize the messages, such as AID i , M i , V and Tr, transmitted among the wearable bio-sensor i, the local processing unit j and the BSN server. Without revealing the real identity of bs i in public, the local processing unit j and the BSN server only need to know whether the involved partner bio-sensor i is legitimate or not. Explained in a more detailed way, the identity bs i is transmitted in a randomized cipher text format instead of plaintext during each session. As a result, the proposed communication procedures can provide the property of sensor anonymity and untraceability. In addition, the shadow identity mechanism is used because loss of synchronization between the bio-sensor i and the BSN server may occur. Even if the attacker interrupts the shadow identity, it cannot retrieve any clue regarding entity identification and traceability due to the un-linkable property of these shadow identities.
Claim 2: Resistance against forgery attack and replay attack.
Attackers may intend to deceive the legal communication entities via fake messages. However, without the knowledge of N i and K i , it is difficult for the attacker to counterfeit legitimate request (or response) messages such as {AID i , M i ,Tr seq (if req.), LPU j , GPS j } and {Tr, BSN, V } for purposes of spoofing. Even if the attacker sends a previously eavesdropped message to a victim party, the verification of previously-used messages will fail. This is because the random number N i is used at a previous session. Therefore, the resistance to forgery attack and replay attack are obviously embedded in our system.
Claim 3: Preservation of data confidentiality. In the proposed communication procedures, all of the transmitted messages {AID i , M i ,Tr seq (if req.), LPU j , GPS j } and {Tr, BSN, V } are well-protected via the robust oneway hash function, i.e. SHA-3 (512 bits), and a high-entropy secret K i chosen by S. Without knowing the secret, it is difficult for attackers to break the SHA-3 hash function or to retrieve any useful information from transmitted cipher texts owing to the irreversibility of the one-way hash function. Data confidentiality is thus guaranteed. 
V. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
To evaluate the practicability of the proposed scheme, we implement the major security components of our scheme on an IoT-based testbed, i.e. a Raspberry Pi series platform. The basic implementation environment is as shown in Table 2 , where the Raspberry Pi II platform (i.e. Figure 4 ) is simulated as an intelligent mobile object or local processing unit. We adopt SHA-3 (512 bits) as the secure one-way hash VOLUME 4, 2016 function [3] , while the ECC based scalar multiplication operations (in which elliptic curve points over a prime field GF(p) with a 384 bit prime p) and the random number generator (96 bits) are implemented with the Bouncy Castle Crypto APIs [6] . The experiment is programmed via Open JDK and Eclipse 3.8. In the system implementation, all of the random numbers, entity identities and secrets are set to 96-bits for appropriate security density. Table 3 demonstrates the computation cost required in our proposed scheme. During the authentication phase between the local processing unit and the BSN server, the computation cost of 12 ECC based scalar multiplication operations and 8 SHA-3 operations is required to perform a session key agreement for secure communication. Taking into account the consideration of security robustness, ECC based scalar multiplication (over a prime field GF(p) with a 384 bit prime p) is implemented on the Raspberry Pi II platform. In brief, the proposed scheme needs at most 4.056 ms for performing 12 ECC based scalar multiplication operations and 8 SHA-3 operations. The computation cost is useracceptable. In the authentication phase among the wearable bio-sensor, the local processing unit and the BSN server, we require at most 4.965 ms to perform 2 random number generations (RN), 12 SHA-3 and 4 XOR operations. In our experiments, we find that the major overhead is based on the SHA-3 (with output 512 bits) operations in which 78.8% and 96.7% of computation cost are needed, respectively, during the two authentication processes. If we replace the SHA-3 operation with traditional SHA-family techniques, the system efficiency can be further improved and the overhead of our proposed scheme will be dominated by the ECC based scalar multiplication computation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have demonstrated a secure healthcare system for IoT-oriented BSN infrastructures in which two authentication processes are proposed to satisfy major security requirements. According to our experiments, the computation times of 4.056 ms and 4.965 ms are needed for performing two authentication mechanisms, respectively, on a common IoT-based development platform, i.e. the Raspberry Pi II. Although the computation cost is user-acceptable, the system efficiency can be further improved once the adopted crypto-hash-modules are substituted by the traditional SHA-2 techniques. In addition, we investigate the security of the proposed authentication schemes via rigorous formal analysis. The robustness of the two schemes is proved. In brief, according to the analysis and implementation results, we have proved that the proposed schemes are suitable to be implemented on common intelligent mobile objects with robust security density. Hence, the practicability of our proposed IoT-based healthcare system is guaranteed.
